

*United States Marine Corps
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

A NEW ORDER FOR THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF EUROPE



SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

LTCOL BRENT HEARN II

AY 01-02

Mentor: Dr. J. Cann

Approved: _____

Date: _____

Mentor: LtCol D. Kelley

Approved: _____

Date: _____

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 01-07-2002		2. REPORT TYPE Student research paper		3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) xx-xx-2001 to xx-xx-2002	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A New Order for the Security and Defense of Europe Unclassified				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Hearn II, Brent ;				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University, MCCDC 2076 South Street Quantico, VA22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street, MCCDC Quantico, VA22134-5068				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APUBLIC RELEASE					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See report.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON	
		Public Release	54	EM114, (blank) lfenster@dtic.mil	
a. REPORT Unclassified	b. ABSTRACT Unclassified	c. THIS PAGE Unclassified		19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER International Area Code Area Code Telephone Number 703767-9007 DSN 427-9007	
				Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18	

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

FORM APPROVED - - - OMB NO. 0704-0188

public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters services, directorate for information operations and reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the office of management and budget, paperwork reduction project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK)		2. REPORT DATE		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE A NEW ORDER FOR THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE OF EUROPE				5. FUNDING NUMBERS N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) LTCOL BRENT HEARN II					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE 2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5068				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER NONE	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SAME AS #7.				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER: NONE	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES NONE					
12A. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT NO RESTRICTIONS				12B. DISTRIBUTION CODE N/A	
ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS) A NEW SECURITY AND DEFENSE ARRANGEMENT FOR WESTERN EUROPE, ONE THAT DEPENDS ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF BOTH THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) AND THE UNITED STATES/NATO, IS APPROPRIATE AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL. THE COMBINED EFFORT OF THE THREE WILL ULTIMATELY RESULT IN GREATER REGIONAL STABILITY. SPECIFICALLY, IT WILL PROVIDE A DEGREE OF AUTONOMY FOR AND INCREASED DEFENSE BURDEN SHARING BY THE EU, IT WILL ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO REMAIN ENGAGED IN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, AND IT WILL ENSURE THE CONTINUED PREEMINENCE OF NATO IN THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE. ENSURING THE FUTURE SUCCESS OF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT REQUIRES THAT SEVERAL OUTSTANDING ISSUES BE ADDRESSED AND RESOLVED SUCH AS THE INADEQUATE LEVEL OF EU DEFENSE SPENDING, PENDING EU AND NATO MEMBERSHIPS, COORDINATION OF INTRA-EUROPEAN MILITARY FORCES AND THE INDEPENDENT USE OF SUPPLEMENTARY NATO CAPABILITIES BY THE EU.					
14. SUBJECT TERMS (KEY WORDS ON WHICH TO PERFORM SEARCH) EUROPEAN SECURITY, EUROPEAN DEFENSE, EUROPEAN UNION, WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION, NATO, CJTF, RAPID REACTION FORCE, UNITED STATES AND NATO				15. NUMBER OF PAGES: 47	
				16. PRICE CODE: N/A	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED		18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE: UNCLASSIFIED		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT					

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: A New Order for the Security and Defense of Europe

Author: LtCol B. Hearn II, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: As a result of political and economic changes that have recently occurred in Western Europe, the collective interests of the European Union (EU), NATO, and the United States would, in the future, be better served through the formulation of a specifically defined and semi-autonomous EU military capability. This capability, however, would still exist within the context of a revised, more contemporary NATO alliance.

Discussion: A number of Western European nations have taken measures to unite both politically and economically. The result has been the formation of the European Union (EU). As a consequence of political and economic union, as well as other regional developments such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the Balkan crisis, the EU has come to recognize a need for a more appropriate security and defense arrangement. In short the EU has formalized specific security and defense responsibilities, identified force structure to accomplish these responsibilities, and has taken measures to coordinate its efforts with NATO. For their part, the United States and NATO recognize the benefit and necessity of remaining engaged in Europe, of granting a measure of autonomy to the EU regarding security matters, and in supplementing the military capability of the EU.

Conclusions: A new security and defense arrangement for Western Europe, one that depends on the contributions of both the EU and the United States/NATO, is appropriate and mutually beneficial. The combined effort of the three will result in greater regional stability. Specifically, the proposed arrangement will provide a degree of autonomy for and increased defense burden sharing by the EU, allow the United States to remain engaged in European affairs, and will additionally ensure the continued preeminence of NATO in Western Europe. Ensuring the future success of such an arrangement still requires that several outstanding issues be addressed such as the inadequate level of EU defense spending, pending EU and NATO memberships, coordination of intra-European military forces and the independent use of supplementary NATO capabilities by the EU.

Table of Contents

	Page
DISCLAIMER	2
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	3
PREFACE	4
INTRODUCTION	6
BACKGROUND	9
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE	12
U.S./NATO PERSPECTIVE	17
ACTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION	22
ACTIONS OF U.S./NATO	29
RUSSIA, EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE	33
TURKEY AND "ASSURED ACCESS"	36
CONCLUSION	37
BIBLIOGRAPHY	43

DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

Illustrations


	Page
Figure 1. Memberships: NATO/EU/WEU	5
Figure 2. WEU Membership Classifications	27
Figure 3. Contributing Nations (FAWEU)	27
Figure 4. EU Expansion	35

Preface

Change is an obvious and essential aspect of our existence. Pervasive and continuous, its effects are inescapable. By anticipating and adapting though, this condition can be used to advantage. This is an especially relevant outlook when applied to the security and defense of Western Europe. Inevitably, the governing institutions there have been steadily combining and transforming. This occurrence is manifested in the emergence of the European Union. Although the end result of integrating the disparate political, economic, and military institutions of Europe is unknown today, it is certain that the outcome will have wide impact. As a result, it is of paramount importance to the United States, the European community, and the world at large that all related issues be taken into account so that maximum, mutual advantage and benefit can be derived.

The intent of this study is first, to explore the issues that bear on the security and defense of Europe. This will be accomplished by describing the perspectives and actions of the European Union, NATO, and the United States. Second, deficiencies in current security and defense plans will be identified and, finally, viable alternatives will be proposed.

MEMBERSHIPS¹



¹ Peter Van Ham, Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia. (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: The Marshall Center Papers, No. 1, European Center for Security Studies, 2000), 10.

A re-empowering of Europe with new responsibilities and capabilities is thus on the international agenda, not only because history is knocking again at Europe's door, but also because it is in the best interest of the United States.²

Edward Foster

The changes that have occurred throughout Europe over the last fifteen years have been both unexpected and of monumental proportion. In particular, three watershed events have left a distinct mark during this time. Of even greater consequence, each has produced considerable speculation regarding the future. The fall of the Berlin wall and subsequent reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact military alliances, and the advent of the Balkan crisis have individually and collectively necessitated a re-evaluation of the European security and defense status quo. Cataclysmic and obvious as these events were, however, they certainly did not result in an immediate change to the long established and fundamental defense and security relationships extant between Europe and the United States. Instead, they have served to facilitate a transformation that is slowly, steadily and inexorably occurring. The changes in Europe's security and defense posture and outlook are evolutionary and have a basis in the developing economic, foreign and security policies and arrangements of the newly emerging European community. If properly developed and nurtured these changes

² Edward Foster and Gordon Wilson, CJTF- A Lifeline For a European Defence Policy? (Whitehall, London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1997), 2.

can coincide with and enhance the traditional transatlantic alliance to the mutual benefit of all concerned.

The trend in Western Europe today is away from nationalism and the fashionably antiquated idea of the "nation state". Preserving individual sovereignty, defined territorial boundaries, and cultural distinctions is a philosophy that is gradually and seemingly becoming outmoded. Emerging in its place is an "integrated" and inter-related regional arrangement known as the European Union (EU), the operative aspect of which is not so much union but integration. This popular term implies not just unification but in a stricter, more accurate sense, both the "organization of individuals of different groups" and the incorporation as equals into society."³ This growing phenomenon is something more than the "United States of Europe" as first proposed by Winston Churchill in the early 1950s. Like the citizens of the United States, dedicated to the Constitution, those of the European Union have committed themselves to the concept of a common identity and common economic and political system based on mutually beneficial and binding agreements.

Considering the dimensions of the proposed integration, as well as the disparity of the participants, the pace has been expectedly slow, marked at times by a great deal of bureaucratic paralysis and a lack of consensus either among the members or within the individual member constituencies. It must be emphasized, however, that despite

the obstacles, movement is steadily occurring. Significant strides have been made and successes are now measurable in the effort to establish a common European identity, a common economic (monetary and trade) partnership, and the development of a common political body. As might be expected, these changes have wide implications. Development of the European Union has led to several realizations: first, protection of collective European interests is of growing concern and requires a new comprehensive strategy and appropriate capabilities. Second, these interests will not necessarily be restricted to the European continent, and third actions in Europe will continue to have an influence on the United States as well as implications for NATO.

Through numerous protocols, treaties, and agreements the nascent European economic community has gradually constituted its own military decision making apparatus, identified and assembled military forces, developed accords for the employment of these forces, and established interim military responsibilities and capabilities. Of fundamental concern, however, is whether the EU has positioned itself to provide a legitimate, credible, and effective measure of security, and furthermore, how the EU's capability fits into the Atlantic Alliance. From the traditional "power projection" standpoint, Europe is far from achieving an adequate stand-alone capability

³ Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, (C&C Merriam Co, 1997).

and, in fact, is increasingly falling behind in its ability to act in coalition with the United States or to even meet its current and standing NATO obligations.⁴ Some in Europe would even argue that these recognized deficiencies in military capability are either surmountable or irrelevant given the expected results of integrating the European community.

Practically speaking though, in light of the current state of world affairs and growing apprehensions about the future, the collective interests of the EU, NATO, and the United States would best be served through the development of a specifically defined and autonomous EU military capability that exists within a transformed NATO alliance.

Background

As is well known, Western Europe in the mid 20th century found itself in total chaos and its societies on the verge of extinction. Survival to any degree required the development of a new and truly sustainable order. Painfully clear was the fact that "the traditional European policy of maintaining a balance of power was both practically and morally defunct."⁵ Finally, evidence of the failed order was convincing enough to impose real change on an exhausted and demoralized populace. Effective

⁴ Benjamin F. Nelson, NATO Implications of European Integration for Allies' Defense Spending (GAO Report to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate: GAO/NSIAD-99-185, June 1999), 1.

⁵ Werner Weidnefeld, America and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable? (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996), 35.

political and economic relationships capable of sustaining themselves would have to be constructed in Europe. As if internal strife was not enough, "the growing Soviet threat....brought home to the states of the Western world the urgency of developing a genuinely common defense and security policy." ⁶ To address this last development, the Washington Treaty of April 1949 was signed. This document established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Atlantic Alliance. Under its auspices the following relationship between the parties was established: an attack on one constituted an attack on all.⁷ Backing this arrangement was the proven defense capability and resolve of the United States. All parties were united in a common ideology against an obvious enemy that stood in marked contrast. Fundamentally, the Atlantic Alliance provided collective, physical protection to Western Europe and precluded the "reemergence of a hegemonic power."⁸ But of even greater consequence, it resulted in a benign environment wherein the members were free to develop economically and politically. With regard to the former, it was wholly anticipated that Europe would develop a healthy economic infrastructure and subsequently resume normal trade relations with the United States. Concerning the latter, the ensuing environment created an

⁶ Weidenfeld,42.

⁷ NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995),17.

⁸ Henry Kissinger, Does America need a Foreign Policy? (New York: Simon and

artificial but controlled "laboratory" that enabled the re-introduction of ideas and philosophies ("rationality, human rights, freedom, equality, democracy") that had originally been born in Europe and fully manifested in America.⁹

The system worked exceedingly well and Europeans, relatively secure, progressively began realizing their collective interests and the benefits accruing from coordinated effort. Interestingly enough, the first attempt at unifying Europe after the war occurred in 1948. The European Defense Community (EDC), with its own defense mechanisms, was proposed as a means of providing mutual protection. This early foray was obviously premature especially in light of the weak economic conditions in Europe and the looming Soviet threat. Not until the fall of the Soviet Union and the re-unification of Germany would Europe have its greatest opportunity for successful consolidation. But the general euphoria that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union also masked a failure to anticipate new foreign policy considerations. The loss of a definable threat coupled with the absence of a future strategy consequently led to changes in spending priorities for both the Europeans and the United States. For the former, "domestic

Schuster, 2001), 43.

⁹ Weidenfeld, 23.

social issues" became the funding priority whereas the latter initiated a general draw-down in defense spending.¹⁰

European Perspective

Regarding Europe's view of security and defense, continued association with the Atlantic Alliance and a close relationship with the United States is still widely recognized as necessary. Europeans are undoubtedly grateful for the equanimity of American leadership, the physical protection provided vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and the economic and material well-being that has resulted from the long association with the United States. Like any relationship though, there are frictions. At times, Europeans have questioned American commitment and ingenuousness.

Although it is an obvious and accepted fact that domestic considerations and the national interests of the United States have a significant impact on the conduct of foreign policy, Europeans want assurances that actions in the region reflect *mutual interests*. Increasing U.S. threats of unilateral action throughout the world have caused European apprehension and promoted negative connotations of American hegemony. As a result, there is a growing feeling that the individual interests and values of an increasingly distant United States have superceded those of a "collective" alliance and Europe in

¹⁰ Nelson, 2.

particular.¹¹ Recent discussions regarding American troop draw-downs on the continent have also caused concern. In addition, and perhaps of even greater importance, Europeans want to ensure that they have a say in security and defense issues commensurate with the degree of risk they assume or are subjected to. During the height of the Cold War, these issues were moot. The fact that the United States had political will and military capability and that Europe provided flank security and a base of operations created a symbiotic relationship between the two. Of course, ties of culture and a common heritage were also important factors. For Europeans, several conditions have now combined to change this relationship. Most obviously, the Soviet threat has dissolved. To be sure, "Russia's strategic weight in Europe remains considerable" but her lack of unity does mitigate the threat.¹² Fundamentally, at least until the crisis in Kosovo, the lingering European question was -what does NATO provide in the absence of the Warsaw Pact? In light of Kosovo, the Europeans realized the limitations of their military capabilities and the deficiencies of their integration efforts and progress. Most importantly however, the resulting embarrassment of the Kosovo experience has spurred the European community to seriously consider its security and defense failings. It has been dryly remarked that "...the Kosovo crisis

¹¹ Kissinger, 27-38.

has, therefore, done more for the development of Europe's defense identity than the decade of post-Maastricht deliberations on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy."¹³ Besides stimulating Europe and the Union to action, events in Kosovo also identified certain NATO vulnerabilities.

With integration, Europeans are demonstrating their unity of purpose. Common interests appear now not so much between the United States and Europe but rather among the entities of Western Europe. According to Henry Kissinger, the once strong bonds of culture, values and morality are weakening. Furthermore, America's constant call for Europe to share the "cost" burden of security has sown some discord. Lately, diverging opinion and purpose are evident in the European reaction to such legislation as "the Helms-Burton and Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) bills" as well as the nature, length, and impact on Europe of sanctions taken against both Iraq and Cuba.¹⁴ These differences may be resolved in light of the current world-wide threat of terrorism, but given the European aversion to capital punishment, for instance, it will be interesting to see the outcome regarding the extradition of terrorists, apprehended in Europe or by European forces, to face trial and potentially the death penalty in the United States.

¹² Van Ham, 26.

¹³ Van Ham, 5.

By continuing its efforts to forge a common union of politics, economics, and ultimately defense, Europe is displaying a genuine desire to resume its fundamental and natural obligations. Europeans have the greatest vested interest in the affairs of Europe. There is, consequently, a growing feeling that they should assume a measure of "self-determination" with regard to the aforementioned issues. As Peter Van Ham observes in his book, Europe's New Defense Ambitions, "a Europe based on political solidarity cannot accept the silent NATO rule 'who pays, plays'.¹⁵ Europeans may not want to accept this rule, but they certainly realize that it has practical merit. As a result, although spending on defense may have declined, the EU and the Europeans have committed themselves to increased spending on humanitarian assistance and nation building efforts.

Lastly, there is also a prevailing opinion that unlike NATO, a predominantly military institution, the EU will have an inherent advantage in crisis resolution due to its ability to draw on the full range of the elements of power: economic, political, and military. Europe is aware of the deficiencies it has regarding these elements, especially concerning military capability. To counteract these deficiencies and to ensure that

¹⁴ David Boren, Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 21.

¹⁵ Van Ham, 19.

the military capabilities serving Europe are suitable and coordinated, an agreement to supplement the EU with certain NATO capabilities is currently being negotiated. The distillation of the aforementioned opinions, in conjunction with strides toward integration, have led the EU to conclude the following regarding security and defense:

- Development of a security policy and defense capability is a natural obligation that arises from economic and political activity.
- To safeguard its interests given the current world order, the EU will have to more actively engage in military operations and devote more resources to the development of its military capabilities.
- Through continued integration, conflict within Europe is expected to be limited as a result of the high degree of interaction and interdependency between the members of the EU. Consequently, a preponderance of security and defense effort should be devoted to crisis prevention and management, peacemaking and peacekeeping, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.¹⁶
- For the conflicts that ultimately do arise within Western Europe, continuing EU efforts will focus on providing a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military responses. If a military response is required then the EU will ensure that it has the flexibility to act with some degree of autonomy or in combination with NATO and/or non-allied European nations.
- Relations with NATO, the United States, and non-allied European nations will continue to evolve.

¹⁶ T.R. Reid, "The New Europe". National Geographics Jan. 2002: 32.

For Europeans a continued relationship with NATO and, by extension, the United States is an absolute necessity for the foreseeable future. It is painfully obvious that the EU lacks the capability to plan and sustain military operations, to transport its forces, or to effectively collect and disseminate intelligence. Consideration, however, should nonetheless be given to the fact that the reason for the original defense relationship has changed. As a result, it should also follow that the hierarchy of a new, emerging relationship should be adapted accordingly. Mutual, transatlantic interests will continue to be based on economics and trade. Because of the close relationships and inter-dependencies being engendered in Europe, arising security issues are expected to relate more to peace-keeping and peace-making. This certainly does not imply that a traditional military capability on the order of NATO is outdated. If future security issues are in keeping with the aforementioned premise then inherent EU capabilities represented by a small, rapidly deployable force could be sufficient. Spread throughout its constituency and in varying degrees, the European Union does possess sufficient manpower to achieve this vision; however, it currently lacks the infrastructure necessary to make that manpower a viable and legitimate force.

U.S./NATO Perspective

The United States has always considered itself Europe's faithful partner and welcome friend. This relationship was founded on more than an equation of power politics or economics. Of greater consequence, the two share a common heritage and history. Regarding the issue of European security and defense, however, Americans have held contradictory views, on one hand calling for "increased burden-sharing" while on the other "wary of Europe following its own course in the foreign policy and security area" or of the construction of a "fortress Europe."¹⁷ Throughout the recent Balkan crisis in Europe, Americans have alternately inveighed that either their interests were not at risk and U.S. participation was not warranted, or that servicemen and women should not be endangered on the ground, or that U.S. soldiers would not serve under foreign commanders. Reservations were further exacerbated by Europe's lack of willingness to increase defense spending or to take a more active part in ensuring its own security. Over time, Americans have felt as though the cost and responsibility of defending Europe was inequitably distributed. At NATO's Rome Summit in 1989, then President George H. Bush typified both American ambivalence as well as growing frustration over the changes besetting the U.S./European defense relationship by challenging

¹⁷ Sophie Vanhoonacker, The Bush Administration (1989-1993) and the Development of a European Security Identity. (England: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2001.),13.

the Europeans to "...love us or tell us to leave."¹⁸ At that time, the Europeans quickly and emphatically responded that a continued U.S. relationship and direct support was still necessary and valued.

Since then, given the effects of the Soviet collapse, the implications of world trade, and the growth of the European Union, the United States has been philosophically torn between following Thomas Jefferson's proscription to avoid foreign "entanglements" and the need to remain engaged. In Europe, now more than ever, the United States cannot afford to "abstain from active foreign policy."¹⁹ The following is illustrative of the potential impact of the European Union on the United States:

Today's 15-member EU has a total population of around 380 million people- about 35 percent more than the U.S. (If all of the 13 current applicants for membership were to join up, the EU population would reach about 550 million.) The combined GDP of the 15 members is about 7.8 trillion dollars, drawing ever closer to America's 9.9 trillion...That kind of economic heft provides considerable clout in global affairs, and Europeans have not been shy about flexing their unified muscles.²⁰

These statistics are thought provoking but must undoubtedly be placed in the appropriate context. U.S. policymakers are only too aware of the following facts: Europeans consign resources to support social welfare instead of satisfying defense (NATO) obligations, the EU does not wield the consolidated authority of a federal government and lacks the

¹⁸ Gary L. Guertner, Collective Security in Europe and Asia. (Carlisle Barracks, PA Strategic Concepts in National Military Strategy Series, 1992), 62.

¹⁹ Weidenfeld, 26.

ability to make binding decisions or to set comprehensive spending priorities, and the "euro", the EU's new specie, does not have the strength or clout of the dollar. The important take away, however, is that Europeans do have a great and growing appreciation for the power of collective action and that their political and economic "market share" will increase in the future. For these reasons, and with a view toward establishing a long-term foreign policy, the U.S. must remain engaged and must adapt itself to the changing European landscape. In the past, events have made the U.S. painfully and surprisingly aware that isolation, vice a continuous and healthy interaction with Europe, inevitably and ultimately leads to involvement at a much higher cost and risk.

Fortunately, there seems to be increasing agreement that "it is in the best interest of the U.S. to closely follow the process of European integration, and if possible, try to influence it so that it does not develop in a direction which is detrimental to US interests."²¹ To that end, U.S. foreign policy, as articulated by then Secretary of State Madeline Albright, can be summed up with three D's: no duplication, no decoupling, and no discrimination. The United States, in essence, said that it does "not want: a decoupling of Europe's security from that of America's; a duplication of effort and

²⁰ Reid, 43.

capabilities; or discrimination against those allies outside the EU." To put the pronouncement in a positive light, Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, restated it as the "three I's...the indivisibility of the transatlantic link; the improvement of European capabilities; and the inclusiveness of all allies in Europe's defense policy."²²

Ultimately, the United States considers NATO a capable and tested bird in the hand to the potential EU/WEU's two in the bush. This point has been confirmed by events in Kosovo. Although lacking the other elements of power, Washington has concluded that NATO, legitimized over the decades of the Cold War has, "occupied an extremely powerful position on the European continent and that, if it wanted to maintain some of the related advantages, the preservation of the Alliance, even in a extensively revised form, was an important asset."²³ As is discussed in a later section, NATO revisions have been and are being made to reflect the changing political conditions in Europe. Obviously, adding a new dimension to the transatlantic relationship is the advent of global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and the rise of latent nationalism. To be sure these will all increase the apprehension of the United States especially as the EU begins to participate more actively and

²¹ Vanhoonacker, 13.

²² Van Ham, 15.

²³ Vanhoonacker, 13.

independently in world events. Certainly, there is the hope that whatever the future brings, the emerging European security and defense capability will serve to complement the relationship already established and consequently lead to a more stable world order.

Actions of the European Union

It has been interesting to note that the recent unveiling of the euro by the European Union was met with generally brief and mild curiosity in America. For the most part, the true symbolism of this herculean achievement has been completely missed. Convenience to travelers aside, common currency embodies Europe's new, hard won, and long evolving unification effort. This accomplishment represents physical proof of the fact that the Union can reach consensus and produce substantial, comprehensive results. Through the vehicle of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) the European community has displayed a willingness to subject itself to a common fiscal regimen. Consequently, increased revenue should be derived from monetary efficiencies and, ideally, these increases will be spent on defense initiatives. Getting to this point has entailed considerable behind the scenes machinations, compromise and, above all, risk. In short, the vestiges and fears of the old

independent European nation states have been and are being gradually deconstructed.

As Marten Van Heuven asserts in American Perspectives, "Europe is a pluralist composition" that is "exercised through the web of European institutions."²⁴ If this is true, then her strength lies in both her plurality and this figurative web, comprised of a wide-range of institutions. The European Community of the future intends to exercise its power through inter-dependencies and inter-relationships and is founded on the precept that these arrangements will prove strong enough to withstand ethnic and cultural differences and that, for the frictions that do arise, the force available in conjunction with the appropriate governing arrangement, e.g. diplomatic measures, will be sufficient to diffuse and resolve whatever security related crisis arise. The European Union has steadily developed a myriad of agreements to solidify inter-dependency. To fully appreciate the complexities of the new relationships and to demonstrate how the creation of the European Union has influenced the development of European security policy and defense capability, some of the more significant and pertinent agreements have been briefly detailed in chronological order below:

Maastricht Treaty (November 1993)

²⁴ Marten Van Heuven. American Perspective (RAND CORP., Santa Monica, CA 1999),3.

- Defining document that revised and consolidated the three initiating documents of the original European Community (EC) and thereby transformed the EC into the European Union (EU).
- Established a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) later re-named the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
- Established "economic conditions for countries to join the euro area" such as "reducing general government deficits to 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and showing progress toward lowering general government debt to 60 percent of GDP."²⁵

Under Article J.4.1, the Treaty essentially confers on the EU a "joint" foreign policy obligation and further stipulates that the "common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense."²⁶ It was furthermore anticipated that this would ultimately be satisfied under the aegis of the Western European Union (WEU).

Amsterdam Treaty (May 1997)

- Modified the Maastricht Treaty to convey that the move toward a common defense was "progressive" in nature and not quite so ambiguous with regard to when it would be implemented.²⁷

²⁵ Nelson, 4.

²⁶ Hanna Ojanen, Non-Alignment and European Security Policy. (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute for International Affairs. 2000), 39.

²⁷ Ojanen, 40.

- Directed that EU defense and security responsibilities would specifically be tied to the Petersberg Tasks as codified in Bonn, Germany, June 1992.
- Agreed that the execution of such roles as "peacekeeping, monitoring, and conflict prevention" would be the purview of the Western European Union (WEU).

The Petersberg tasks are listed as follows:

1. Humanitarian and rescue tasks.
2. Peacekeeping tasks.
3. Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The tasks obviously have nothing to do with the projection of military power in the traditional (U.S./NATO) sense and the adoption of these particular tasks can undoubtedly be interpreted in a number of ways. Primarily, it could indicate that the EU recognizes its limitations with regard to providing a defense capability and/or that, it does not expect a unified Europe will require the projection of traditional military power. There is undoubtedly some truth in both; however, current capability and expectations aside, by this action the Union manifests its modest intentions and desire to participate in security and defense and to take physical responsibility for ensuring the stability of its own community.

Of the various proceedings and declarations, the following generated considerable attention due to the apparent change in traditional British policy:

St Malo Declaration (December 1998)

- Anglo-French initiative symbolizing England's growing association with the continent regarding foreign/security policy and establishment of an "in-house" defense capability.
- Asserted that the EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to *international crisis*..."²⁸

Cologne European Council (June 1999)

- Officially confirmed the incorporation of the Western European Union into the EU.

Although currently it "has neither its own forces nor command structures", the WEU is an organization conceptually destined for a large role in the future of the European Union. Finally integrated into the community, the organization, which actually predates NATO by one year, is intended to give the EU an operational capability. Currently, to achieve that objective, the WEU has at its disposal the "Forces Answerable to the WEU" (FAWEU). These forces "could be made available to WEU on a case-by-case basis for specific operations that have been designated by the WEU nations" with the consent of the owning nation. In addition, the WEU is theoretically capable of asking NATO for assets, "including Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs),

²⁸ Mathiopoulis & Gyarmati. Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense. *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1999, 65+

for its operations.”²⁹ Two important aspects of the WEU should further be noted. First, the United States, Russia, Eastern and Central Europe are members to varying degrees. Second, membership regardless of classification as delineated in Figure 2 below implies a right to participate in WEU operations to some degree.

Associate Members	Associate Partners	Observers
Czech Republic	Bulgaria	Denmark
Hungary	Estonia	Austria
Iceland	Latvia	Finland
Norway	Lithuania	Ireland
Poland	Romania	Sweden
Turkey	Slovakia	

WEU Membership Classifications
Figure 2³⁰

Figure 3 following provides additional details regarding the FAWEU:

FORCE

CONTRIBUTING NATIONS

²⁹ Western European Union Home Page. WEU and NATO. 10 Jan. 2002
<<http://www.weu.int/eng/info/nato.htm>>

³⁰ Van Ham, 10.

EUROCORPS	Belgium	France	Germany	Luxembourg	Spain		
Multinational DIV	Belgium	Germany	Netherlands	U.K.			
UK/Netherlands Amphib Force	U.K.	Netherlands					
EUROFOR (Rapid Deploy Force)	France	Italy	Portugal	Spain			
EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force)	France	Italy	Portugal	Spain			
1 st German/Netherlands Corps (HQ)	Germany	Netherlands					
Spanish-Italian Amphib Force	Spain	Italy					
European Air Group	Belgium	France	Germany	Italy	Netherlands	Spain	U.K.

Figure 3³¹

Helsinki European Council (December 1999)

- Proposed the formation of a "Common European Security and Defense Policy" (CESDP) in order to initiate development of a European crisis management capability that incorporates and uses NATO assets without direct NATO involvement.³²
- Ratified a "headline goal" for its 15 members that called for the establishment of a European "rapid reaction force".
- Outlined the required capabilities of this force as follows: "must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks."³³
- Called for the development of "new political and military bodies" to satisfy the objectives of the EU.
- Qualified the relationship between the EU and NATO.
- Introduced the role of "non-EU European NATO members and other interested States".

³¹ Western European Union Home Page. Development of WEU's Operational Capabilities. 10 Jan. 2002 <<http://www.weu.int/eng/info/opcap.htm>>

³² Centre for European Reform, EU Defense Policy. <http://www.cer.org.uk/nr_01/index.html>

³³ Mark Oakes, *Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Progress Report*. (London: House of Commons Library, Research Paper 00/84, 31 October 2000.),37.

The above actions clearly define a natural progression. The European Union has made significant strides with regard to the formulation of foreign policy, establishment of a security policy, and most importantly, the development of a defense and security capability. Practically speaking, the EU is currently organizing the FAWEU and is establishing the criteria and conditions for using both the individual elements and the entity as a whole. Furthermore, the EU is working to clearly institute the political mechanisms for activation and employment. The union fully realizes that, currently, it lacks sufficient infrastructure to provide command and control, intelligence collection, lift, and logistical support to the force. Once interim agreements with NATO are negotiated and signed they will not only provide authority to the EU/WEU, but will also entitle the WEU to borrow the aforementioned capabilities from NATO. The "quid pro quo" of this arrangement is that it allows NATO and the U.S. to avoid participation in every crisis arising in Europe while still indirectly supporting European security. Both parties can potentially benefit from this arrangement.

Actions of U.S./NATO

Without the loss of its traditional threat, and in light of recent developments in Europe, NATO has had to adapt in order to retain its primacy and legitimacy in European affairs. This

process has been of great interest to the United States because of its need to remain engaged in the affairs of Europe.

Excerpted from Robert Pearson's essay, *Essential Elements of European Security*, the following passage summarizes the current condition:

In modern world history, there has been no global security without European security. In this century it has not been possible to think of European security without American involvement. And, the United States is committed to NATO as the principal institution to represent and advance American security interests in Europe.³⁴

Although perhaps slow to realize and react to the changes in Europe, NATO has nevertheless made several landmark decisions in an attempt to accommodate itself to a new Europe increasingly governed by the European Union. The decisions, reached in the following forums, are summarized as follows:

NATO Summit Meeting: Brussels (May 1989)

- Called for a reduction of conventional forces in Europe.
- "...outlined Alliance's approach to overcoming the division of Europe and the shaping of a just and peaceful European order."³⁵
- Recognized changing environment particularly with regard to the Soviet Union and Eastern/Central Europe.
- Established European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept.

³⁴ Barry, Charles L. and Souchon, Lennart, editors. Security Architecture For Europe. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.), 59.

³⁵ NATO Handbook, 72.

- Designated that the Deputy, SACEUR would have the authority to command NATO forces transferred to the WEU.

Both the ESDI and CJTF were proposed as a means of giving Europe more responsibility and autonomy regarding security and defense while simultaneously ensuring Europe's continued incorporation **within** NATO. ESDI conceptually established a European defense "pillar" that was intended to assist in collectively buttressing the Alliance. The CJTF is specifically defined as follows:

CJTF is a multinational (combined) and multi-service (joint) task force, task-organized and formed for the full range of the Alliance's military missions requiring multinational and multi-service command and control by a CJTF Headquarters. It may include elements from non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations.³⁶

Furthermore, the CJTF was created in order "...to make NATO assets available, on the basis of case-by-case decisions by the North Atlantic Council, for operations led by the Western European Union (WEU)."³⁷ This development was especially important because, although it gives Europe more autonomy, NATO and the United States ultimately retain freedom of action and direct influence in European affairs.

NATO Summit Meeting: London (July 1990)

- Identified the need to change the alliance in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union and to "bring confrontation between East and West to an end."³⁸

³⁶ NATO Handbook, 73.

³⁷ NATO Handbook, 73.

³⁸ NATO Handbook, 75.

NATO Summit Meeting: Rome (November 1991)

- Called for reductions in the size of NATO forces deployed in Europe. Recognized the need to "streamline command structure and to adapt ...defense planning arrangements and procedures" given Europe's newly emerging "crisis management and peacekeeping" requirements.³⁹
- Affirmed the intent to include Eastern and Central Europe in an "evolving partnership".

NATO Summit Meeting: Washington (1999)

- Established protocol for EU/CESDP use of NATO military assets in European crisis management situations when direct NATO involvement is not exercised.
- Established the specific condition that requests for use of NATO assets would be considered on a case-by-case basis.

This summit envisioned a semi-autonomous security role for the EU; however, as originally written the specific condition effectively allows individual NATO members to block EU use of collective NATO assets. Many NATO members supported the "right of first refusal" wherein "in any crisis situation, the EU should get involved only if NATO first determined that the Alliance as a whole would not act."⁴⁰ To preclude these obstacles, a policy of "assured access" or uninhibited use of certain NATO assets has been agreed to by all Alliance members with the exception of

³⁹ NATO Handbook, 76.

⁴⁰ Wim Van Eekelen. *Building European Defence: NATO's ESDI and the European Union's ESDP*. [North Atlantic Assembly Report, Committee Reports, Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence (AT-07-e)] <<http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2000/at-07-e.html>>.

Turkey. The implications of this situation will be addressed later.

All things considered, the United States is committed to supporting the European Union and the ambitions of the wider European community. Washington has recognized that "a failure of the European security policy, whether inside or outside NATO, will only foster (in Europe) continued resentments at American dominance, and (in America) continued resentments at Europe's inadequate sharing of common burdens." Avoiding this conundrum has necessitated the strengthening of Europe in order to "...improve its defense capabilities, *within* the Alliance framework."⁴¹ The adaptations of NATO are essentially meant to strengthen the inter-dependencies of the EU and the United States. In addition, by providing the EU a measure of autonomy and increasing its military capability (lift, command and control, and intelligence) the expectation is that Europeans will be better able to contribute to their own defense. This arrangement is also expected to reduce the burden on NATO and the U.S. and absolve the two of the obligation to participate in every European contingency.

Russia, Eastern and Central Europe

One of the more significant issues confronting both NATO

⁴¹ Rodman, 4.

and the European Union today relates to the potential for acquiring and assimilating new members from Eastern/Central Europe. The "states" in these regions, along with Russia, have indicated certain desires regarding participation in NATO, the EU, or both organizations. Without a doubt, stability in this region would serve everyone's interests and could be enhanced by inclusion in a wider community. Membership and the ensuing stability, however, is predicated on a number of complex dynamics, namely; the degree to which Russia is able to exert its influence in the region, the success of democratic reforms, the transition to free market economies, and the "re-emergence of nationalism" in the prospective members.⁴² With regard to Russia it has made unsuccessful attempts, either through force (Chechnya) or the establishment of a confederation [Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)], to retain influence over its former holdings. Except for the last issue, progress is slowly being made in the other areas.

Of the choices available to Eastern and Central Europe, the alternative provided by NATO is especially promising because it symbolizes a credible and legitimate capability based on a readily identifiable and respected quality, the ability to project military power.⁴³ Unfortunately, NATO enlargement has

⁴² Johan J. Host, Exploring Europe's Future: Trends and Prospects Relating to Security. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990), 23.

⁴³ Van Ham, 32.

been numbingly slow and is dependent on actions in the U.S. Congress. The pace, justifiably so, has been slow due to Russian sensitivities and the inability of prospective members to achieve minimum standards for inclusion. As an interim, good faith measure NATO has established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program but many of the invited members view this move as only a pacifying gesture.

As a complement to the NATO alliance, the alternative option, membership in the EU, also promises comprehensive and mutual benefits. For starters the Union offers economic opportunity and political stability. "The European Community is the primary structuring institution in the present political order in Europe."⁴⁴ More importantly it holds the promise of both "pan-European" and "collective security."⁴⁵ Lastly, Russians see the EU, in general, as less threatening. Specifically they "welcome the EU's military plans as a step to rid Europe of American hegemony and NATO-centrism."⁴⁶ These considerations aside, including Russia and Eastern and Central Europe in a defense framework would increase European security on the whole and add to the potential military capability of the EU. Currently the EU has proposed the following candidates from

⁴⁴ Holst, 29.

⁴⁵ Mary M. McKenzie and Peter Loedel, The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation. (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 1.

⁴⁶ McKenzie, 6.

Eastern/Central Europe for inclusion during the next round of membership talks:

EU EXPANSION		
Bulgaria	Latvia	Slovakia
Czech Republic	Lithuania	Slovenia
Estonia	Poland	Turkey
Hungary	Romania	

Figure 4

This option appears promising but is a considerable way from reality. Outstanding nationalistic tendencies and the cost of incorporation, among other things, are still large impediments that will require resolution before these regions can be incorporated into the EU, NATO, or both entities.

Turkey and "Assured Access"

Turkey is at the center of an unresolved issue for both NATO and the EU. The consequences of this situation directly impinge on the ability of the EU to develop an autonomous security and defense capability. Stemming partly from its altercation with Greece over the island of Cyprus, Turkey has consistently been excluded from full membership in the European Union for the last 30 years. Currently it is an Associate member along with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, and Poland. This distinction essentially bars it from deciding or voting on EU crisis management operations. On the contrary, Turkey is an indispensable member of NATO. In this capacity it

alone has vetoed the EU's "assured access" to NATO military assets and "Because of this blockage, the EU does not have guaranteed access to NATO planning facilities at SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. Furthermore, NATO has to approve any formal contact between EU and NATO officials on a case-by-case basis."⁴⁷ This obviously precludes the EU from operating with any degree of autonomy unless it does so without NATO assets. Turkish intransigence stems from fears "that the EU might intervene in an area of strategic interest...such as Cyprus, the Aegean or the Balkans."⁴⁸ Aggravating the situation is the fact that Greece enjoys full membership in both NATO and the EU and that there is great probability that Cyprus will be integrated independently into the EU in 2004-05. This last development seemingly lends credence to Turkey's fears. Several critical shortfalls result if this impasse is not resolved. First, the EU's ability to provide any military capability is limited to the point of being valueless. This, in turn, continues to make Europe more dependent on NATO and the United States, not less so. Second, by excluding non-EU European NATO members and especially Turkey, a strategically important Muslim country astride the East West crossroads, EU foreign policy reflects incredible shortsightedness.

⁴⁷ Charles Grant, *A European View of ESDP*. Centre for European Reform, Sept 2001. <http://www.cer.org.uk/nr_01/esdp_090.pdf>1+.

⁴⁸ Ibid

Conclusion:

A strong desire to develop an autonomous security and defense capability has grown out of the emerging European confederation. Presently, though, the capability is more theoretical than concrete but the ground work has gradually been laid and substantive, collective action taken toward achieving this objective. Today the Europeans are in an ideal position to assume greater responsibility for their own security and to create regional stability. Now more than ever "a grown-up Europe, united within the framework of the EU, cannot afford not to have the necessary means to support its political, economic and other interests."⁴⁹ If peaceful conditions develop in Europe as a result of integration, then the military capability now extant in the EU could, under certain conditions, be sufficient to resolve future crises. As previously described, the Petersberg Tasks are, admittedly, of relatively small magnitude; however, by assuming these responsibilities and by truly developing the means to accomplish them then the EU can begin to establish military legitimacy and a measure of the autonomy that it seeks. Nevertheless, EU considerations represent only one side of the European security and defense issue. In order to produce the most comprehensive and effective coverage, future

⁴⁹ Mathiopoulos, 65.

contributions by the Europeans must be coordinated with and complimentary to the capabilities provided by NATO and the United States. Moreover, continuation of the transatlantic relationship is absolutely essential for all concerned, especially if regional crisis do not follow the expected European model. NATO and the United States provide substantial military capabilities that cannot currently be duplicated by the EU. These capabilities include air and sealift, Command and Control (C2) infrastructure, and intelligence collection and dissemination. In his article, *Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work*, Philip Gordon, former member of the National Security Council, makes the following recommendations for ensuring the continued security and defense of Europe.

EU:

1. Accept greater responsibility for security.
2. Exercise the political will to use the military assets it inherently possesses.
3. Increase defense spending.
4. Allow non-EU members to participate fully when making security decisions that have regional impact.

United States and NATO:

1. Make NATO assets available to the EU on a less restrictive basis than "case-by-case".
2. Increase transatlantic "industrial cooperation" and share defense technologies.⁵⁰

Creating a new "hybrid" security and defense arrangement that includes NATO, the United States, and the EU would

ultimately increase the stability and security of the region while simultaneously establishing a continued *raison d'etre* for NATO, an unquestionable role for the United States, and a measure of autonomy for the European Union. In general, the combined capabilities of these entities would result in the following benefits:

- Resolution of issues through the use of all of the traditional elements of "national" power: political, cultural, diplomatic, and/or military.
- More equitable distribution of defense costs and responsibilities.
- Net increase of military capability.
- Potential incorporation of the wider European region into an integrated and comprehensive security arrangement.
- Increased flexibility with regard to who participates and overall strengthening of the transatlantic relationship.

Promising and straightforward as the above seem there are considerable obstacles. The EU does not yet possess a combined force capable of meeting the responsibilities of the Petersberg Tasks. The primary reason for this deficiency relates to funding. Two important fiscal issues require resolution. First, the EU must establish and assert the authority to set spending priorities and "execute" budgeted euros in order to purchase specific defense capabilities. The second, and most

⁵⁰ Philip H. Gordon, "Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work". [Foreign Affairs](#)

critical issue, requires that Europeans exercise the political willpower to devote more resources to the development and purchase of necessary defense capabilities. As it stands now "the [combined] EU countries spend \$140 billion a year on defence, compared with America's \$290 billion, yet possess about ten percent of America's capacity to deploy and sustain troops".⁵¹ Even more remarkable the United States, with seemingly little effort, intends to expend another \$350 billion on defense in order to fight the current war on terrorism. The potential for increased defense spending does exist in Europe. Greater fiscal discipline, a condition and benefit of membership in the EMU, has resulted in a more stable and promising economic environment.⁵² Efforts to end conscription and consolidate defense related industries are also gradually leading to increased efficiencies. Of course, these changes do not necessarily guarantee increased revenue especially in the short term. In addition, there is no guarantee that increased revenue will ultimately be spent on defense. Absent a clearly defined and looming threat, Europeans may continue to devote resources to social entitlements given its health and welfare system and increasing pension programs. Events in the Balkans have had some effect in this regard and, hopefully, the impressions of

July/August 2000: 1+.

⁵¹ Charles Grant, *European Defence Post Kosovo?*, 2.

⁵² Nelson, 14.

that tragedy, coupled with the new threat of global terrorism, will provide the impetus for adequately funding a new security and defense plan.

For their respective parts, NATO and the United States should also continue to adapt to the changes occurring in Europe. Fundamentally, this can be done by continued promotion of the ESDI. Maximum effort should be applied toward brokering an agreement between the respective parties regarding use of the CJTF and toward resolving the issue of "assured access". In addition, the United States can help in narrowing the capabilities gap by sharing its intelligence assets and industrial gains to an even greater extent. Lastly, potential EU strengths such as humanitarian assistance, crisis prevention/management, and its position vis-à-vis the rest of Europe and Russia should be capitalized upon.

In a time of new economic order (globalization) and political disorder (terrorism), an integrated European Union that is both complemented by NATO and the United States and complementary to them is the best means of ensuring the continued defense and security of Europe. Furthermore the recent actions taken by each, although incomplete, support a shared view of the future. Combining the traditional transatlantic alliance with a new regional security and defense

capability results not only in a strong European community but, consequently, a stronger, more stable world.

Bibliography

Algieri, Franco, Janning, Josef and Rumberg, Dirk, editors. Managing Security in Europe. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996.

Banks, Arthur. A World Atlas of Military History, 1861-1945. New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1978.

Barry, Charles L. and Souchon, Lennart, editors. Security Architecture For Europe. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994.

Baun, Michael, J. An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the Politics of European Integration. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.

Boren, David and Perkins, Edward J. editors. Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999.

Brenner, Michael and Dean, Jonathon. Terms of Engagement: The United States and the European Security Identity. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.

Caplan, Richard and Feffer, John, editors. Europe's New Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

- Collins, Michael J. Western European Integration: Implications for U.S. Policy and Strategy. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992.
- Crawford, Beverly. Editor. The Future of European Security. University of California, Berkeley. International and Area Studies, 1992.
- Davis, Jacquelyn K. and Sweeney, Michael J. Strategic Paradigms 2025: U.S. Security Planning for a New Era. Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 1999.
- De Santis, Hugh. The Reshaping of Europe. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990.
- Duke, Simon. The New European Security Disorder. Great Britain: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1994.
- Feld, Werner J. The Future of European Security and Defense Policy. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1993.
- Foster, Edward and Wilson, Gordon. CJTF- A Lifeline For a European Defence Policy? Whitehall, London: The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1997.
- Gartner, Heinz, Hyde-Price, Adrian, Reiter, Erich. Editors. Europe's New Security Challenges. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001.
- Gordon, Phillip H. "Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work." Foreign Affairs July/August 2000: 1+.
- Grant, Charles. *A European View of ESDP*. Centre for European Reform, Sept 2001.
<http://www.cer.org.uk/nr_01/esdp_090.pdf>.
- Grant, Charles. *European Defence post-Kosovo?*, London: Centre for European Reform, June 1999.
<http://www.cer.org.uk/nr_01>.
- Guertner, Gary L. Collective Security in Europe and Asia. Carlisle Barracks, PA. Strategic Concepts in National Military Strategy Series, 1992.
- Haglund, David G. editor. From Euphoria To Hysteria. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1993.

- Holst, Johan J. Exploring Europe's Future: Trends and Prospects Relating to Security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990.
- Jackson, Robert J. editor. Europe in Transition. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1992.
- Jones, Clive and Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline. editors. International Security In A Global Age. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000.
- Kissinger, Henry. Does America Need A Foreign Policy? New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.
- Lepgold, Joseph. The Declining Hegemon: The United States and European Defense, 1960-1990. New York: Praeger, 1990.
- Mathiopoulos, Margarita and Gyarmati, Istvan: *Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense*. The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1999, 65+.
- Mathews, Jessica. *Estranged Partners*. Foreign Policy Magazine, Nov/Dec 2001.
- McCormick, John. The European Union: Politics and Policies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996.
- McKenzie, Mary M. and Loedel, Peter H. The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.
- Nelson, Benjamin F. *NATO: Implications of European Integration for Allies' Defense Spending*, General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate (GAO/NSIAD-99-185). Washington, D.C., June 1999.
- Oakes, Mark. *Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Progress Report*. London: House of Commons Library, Research Paper 00/84, 31 October 2000.
- Ojanen, Hanna, Herlof, Gunilla, and Lindahl, Rutger. Non-Alignment and European Security Policy- Ambiguity at

- Work. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute on International Affairs, 2000.
- Pages, Erik R. Responding to Defense Dependence: Policy Ideas and the American Defense Industrial Base. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996.
- Rodman, Peter W. *European Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policies- Implications for the United States House of Representatives*, Testimony Before the Committee on International Relations, United States House of Representatives, November 10, 1999.
<http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/testimony/11_10_99Europe.htm>
- Reid, T.R. "The New Europe". National Geographics Jan. 2002: 32+
- Serfaty, Simon. Stay the Course, European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity. Westport, CT: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997.
- Sigal, Leon V. editor. The Changing Dynamics of U.S. Defense Spending. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999.
- Simon, Jeffrey, editor. European Security Policy After The Revolutions of 1989. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Press, 1991.
- Stuart, Douglas T. Can Europe Survive Maastricht?. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
- Van Eekelen, Wim. rapporteur. *Building European Defence: NATO's ESDI and the European Union's ESDP*. [North Atlantic Assembly Report, Committee Reports, Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence (AT-07-e)]
<<http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2000/at-07-e.html>>
- Van Ham, Peter. Europe's New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: The Marshall Center Papers, No. 1, European Center for Security Studies, 2000.

- Van Heuven, Marten. American Perspective. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Van Heuven, Marten. European Security After 2000: An American Perspective. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999.
- Van Heuven, Marten. Sorting Out European Security. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Vanhoonacker, Sophie. The Bush Administration (1989-1993) and the Development of a European Security Identity. England: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2001.
- Western European Union Home Page, 10 Jan. 2002,
<<http://www.weu.int/eng/info/nato.htm>>
- Weidenfeld, Werner. America and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable? Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1996.
- Zielonka, Jan, editor. Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The Hague, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1998.

